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ABSTRACT

GROSS, DANIEL

The American Jewish Organizations’
Response to the Holocaust and their
Ideological Divide, 1933-1943

This thesis examines the response from the different American Jewish groups
during Hitler’s rise to power and the subsequent Holocaust, and how the ideological
divide that formed between Zionists and non-Zionists ultimately shaped the
ultimately limited their ability to exert political influence toward policies to aid
European Jewry. The main groups that were analyzed were the American Jewish
Committee, the Joint Distribution Committee, B’nai B’rith, the American Jewish
Congress, the World Jewish Congress, and the Zionist Organization of America. For
purposes of analysis and clarity, the groups can be divided along the lines of extreme
Zionist, which included the two Congresses and the Zionist Organization of America,
and moderate to non-Zionists, which included the American Jewish Committee, the
Joint Distribution Committee, and B’nai B’rith.
At the core of their debate was how to respond to the growing anti-Semitic threat
in Germany. The extreme Zionists were concerned with the goal of a Jewish
homeland in Palestine and would not divert funds or resources from that goal, while
the moderate to non-Zionists were concerned with the more immediate and pressing
issue of the destruction of European Jewry. Factors that exacerbated these divides
were issues such as anti-Semitism sentiments in the United States, skepticism about
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reports indicating the scale and scope of Nazi oppression of the Jews, and a Federal
Government that believed in an Isolationist approach.
What is abundantly clear is that this fundamental divide shaped the overall lack of
political mobilization. What was constant was a state of paralysis or ineffective
leadership during three seminal moments. Hitler’s appointment to Chancellor of
Germany in January of 1933, with his anti-Semitic beliefs and doctrines, was met
with some concern but generally dismissed by Jewish and political leaders in the
United States. Kristallnacht, the economic destruction of German Jewry on November
9 and 10th, 1938, served as a wake up call to many in the United States, and helped
shed light on the grave situation faced by Jewish refugees, as well as created a sense
of urgency amongst Zionists for the establishment of a homeland. News of the Final
Solution, that was initially found out in August of 1942, left many Jews in a state of
helplessness, as Zionists attempted to further bolster their case for Palestine, while
moderate Zionists and non Zionists were paralyzed in terms of what could be done.

1
Chapter 1- Literature Review
“We must stand as a generation, not only condemned to witness the destruction of a
third of our number but guilty of having accepted it without any resistance worthy of
the name”- Nahum Goldmann, The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann: Sixty Years
of Jewish Life1
From 1938 through 1944, Nazi Germany, led by Adolf Hitler, began a mass
murder of European Jews that culminated in the death of six million. The above
quotation, from Nahum Goldmann, a Zionist leader and founder of the World Jewish
Congress, reflects the frustration over the lack of response and resistance from
Americans, and more particularly, American Jews. As early as 1933, American Jews,
both groups and prominent leaders, began to express concern over the rise of Adolf
Hitler in Germany; despite their concern, and overwhelming evidence of the
persecution of European Jews in the subsequent years, there was a fundamental
divide between the various American Jewish groups that ultimately influenced their
underwhelming response. One would be led to believe that the American Jews would
feel a sense of duty to their European brethren, but when the time came, most did not
act. In 1858, Abraham Lincoln famously said “A house divided against itself cannot
stand”—this quotation can be aptly used to describe American Jews, groups, and the
various leaders, and the lack of common ground they shared. In this thesis, I will
make the argument that the division and overall lack of unity amongst American
Jewry helped to shape and influence the response of the federal government to the
Holocaust.
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A number of factors contributed to the disconnect amongst American Jewry. AntiSemitism, in the 1930’s in particular, was widespread across the United States, which
discouraged people from pursuing high profile activism. Prominent anti-Semitic
figures such as Charles Coughlin, William Pelley, and Gerald Winrod rallied support
against Jews and often downplayed what was happening in Europe during the 1930’s.
Jewish groups, as a result, were reluctant to present themselves as advocating
specifically for Jews. In responding to what was happening in Europe, many Jewish
leaders were hesitant to react aggressively; rather, they often took a measured
response that was in line with the position of the government. This was particularly
true of many prominent Jewish figures in the government, such as Felix Frankfurter
or Louis Brandeis. This reluctance was exacerbated by a fundamental divide among
the various Jewish organizations, particularly between Zionists and non-Zionists. The
Zionist position, while sympathetic to the plight of European Jews, was that the
overriding goal was to settle in Palestine and create an independent Jewish state, and
any immediate response to Hitler would jeopardize that goal. The non-Zionist
factions could not agree on a specific position, and accomplished little as individual
groups. In fact there was even a difference in how the Jewish newspapers reported the
different events.
When analyzing the lack of Jewish response to the Holocaust, another factor that
bears considering is the relationship between American Jews and President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt. It is impossible for the president, despite his reputation in the eyes
in the eyes of many American Jews during this time, to emerge unscathed from what
occurred; he could have done more, but so could have numerous people. What
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becomes clear during these years is that American Jews revered Roosevelt, which
afforded him leeway with his actions. In the eyes of the Jewish people, he could do no
wrong. The American Jewish community placed a great deal of trust in the President
despite a long period of inaction. As mentioned by Henry Feingold, Roosevelt
specialized in the “politics of gesture”, which was often enough to appease the Jewish
masses. It was not just reverence for Roosevelt that complicated the Jewish American
response, but also the lack of a unified leader, voice or agenda to communicate to
Roosevelt. In his book, Were We Our Brothers’ Keeper, Rabbi Haskel Lookstein,
believing that Jewish groups could have had an impact, posits, “Roosevelt was
concerned about winning the war. He was not going to be distracted from the war
effort without strong Jewish pressure. That pressure never came”.2
American perceptions of the Holocaust have evolved as the access to more
information about what occurred has increased. In the two decades following the end
of the Holocaust and World War II, there was a general naïveté in the role played by
America and how it responded—Americans perceived themselves as the proud heroes
who saved the day from the despicable Nazis and the Axis powers. The narrative
began to change somewhat in the 1960’s with the trial in Israel of Adolf Eichmann,
an SS official who had been an implementer of the Final Solution. The actions of
Eichmann confirmed the gruesome actions taken during the Holocaust. However, it
was the book of Hannah Arendt, a refugee from Hitler’s Germany that shocked the
collective American psyche. Arendt, while not vindicating Eichmann, casted a wider
net of blame from the perpetrators of the Holocaust, to the American politicians and
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Jewish leaders who did not react accordingly, despite a disturbing amount of
evidence. In her book Eichmann in Jerusalem, which covered Eichmann’s trial in
Israel, Arendt controversially suggested that Eichmann almost devoid of blame
because, “This was the new law of the land, based on the Führer’s order; whatever he
(Eichmann) did he did, as far as he could see as a law abiding citizen. He did his
duty…he not only obeyed orders, he also obeyed the law.”3Describing the idea of
shared responsibility, Arendt identified Jewish leadership, as it had come up during
Eichmann’s trial, writing, “The Jewish people as a whole behaved magnificently.
Only the leadership failed.”4Arendt also posits that European Jews essentially
complied with their own demise through cooperation with Nazi deportation and
extermination plans.
While not so much addressing the Allie’s role in the Holocaust, Arendt’s work
opened up the floodgates and, “shattered an agreed on moral and historical tale”.
Arendt’s work opened up a period of “self scrutiny, one in which virtually every
aspect of America’s self image was examined assiduously”.5 Arendt’s work
essentially tore down the common narrative that had been associated with the
Holocaust in World War II. Here was someone with first hand experience of what
took place in Europe that was not absolving the Nazis, but spreading the blame out
somewhat. In particular, her suggestion of European Jews’ complicity was an eye
opening opinion. Coupled with the rebellious nature of the 1960’s that was beginning
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to take shape across the American populace, where there was a more general
questioning of authority, the question of guilt began to be reexamined.
It was in the 1960’s that the Holocaust became an event, embedded in the
vernacular of American culture. The cultural context of the 1960’s also played a part
in the national self-examination taking place. The Vietnam War and the Civil Rights
movement awaked passions and stirred controversy across the country. The German
crimes caused an exploration of America and all of its shortcomings. Comparisons of
Americans’ actions in Vietnam to the Nazi war crimes were made. The Civil Rights
movement was analyzed with references to Nazi racial doctrines. In The Emergence
of Holocaust Education in American Schools, author Thomas Fallace illustrates this
infiltration of examination into American culture, as he quoted Rabbi Isaac Toubin, a
former executive vice president of the American Association of Jewish Education, as
saying, “In the midst of our American Crisis, what Jew, understanding the
consequences of hatred, can remain indifferent to the plight of the Negro”.6 With antigovernment fervor increasing, and influencing how Americans perceived history at
the time, the role of President Roosevelt and his administration fell under the
microscope.
In the late 1960’s, David Wyman and Henry Feingold came out with books that
called into question America’s role in the Holocaust. Wyman’s 1967 work, Paper
Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis 1938-1941, dealt with the refugee crisis
during the Holocaust and the stance and policies taken by the Federal

6

Thomas D. Fallace, The Emergence of Holocaust Education in American Schools (New York: Palgrave,
2008), 22.

6
government.7Wyman’s work set the standard in terms of research for many books
dealing with this topic; he used the archives at the Roosevelt Library, as well as the
National Archives, which have been staples in research on this topic. Wyman
suggests that the rampant anti-Semitism in the United States in the 1930’s played a
huge role in the quota system and explained why America admitted so few refugees;
he suggests that Father Coughlin, a rampant anti-Semite, downplayed and minimized
what was occurring abroad. Wyman demonstrates Coughlin’s influence in writing,
“Coughlin rapidly generated a large Catholic anti-Semitic movement and changed the
complexion of organized anti-Jewish agitation…in the wave of violent Nazi
persecution of the Jews, Coughlin minimized the attacks”.8 Wyman included surveys
done by American Jewish groups that that documented the extent to which antiSemitism influenced the collective American psyche. One such survey conducted by
the American Jewish Congress illustrated that 60% of Americans believed that Jews
had objectionable qualities.9
The American Jewish Congress, both before and during the war, believed in a
policy of “quiet diplomacy”. In describing the policy of the American Jewish
Congress, Wyman writes that they “preferred to function more quietly, often through
direct contact with leading people of influence”.10 What was clear, however, was that
there was a sense of apathy amongst the Jewish groups. For instance, the National
Jewish Monthly, the newsletter of B’nai B’rith, did not complain nor call for opening
up the refugee programs. The overall message from Wyman, and one that he expands
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upon in later works, is that all influential parties in the United States, particularly the
Government, failed to meet their potential to help.
Feingold’s The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the
Holocaust, 1938-1945, written at the same time as Wyman’s Paper Walls, analyzed
the issue of rescue of European Jewry, and the response of the Roosevelt
Administration, in particular, the role of the State Department.11 Feingold cites “paper
walls” as how the State Department managed to restrict immigration—namely, they
put forth regulations that made it nearly impossible for Jewish refugees to come to
America. In describing Roosevelt’s reaction, and the reaction of his administration,
Feingold discerned a duplicitous manner in the president, in that Roosevelt would
often remain out of the debate if possible, and could put himself in either camp.
According to Feingold, Roosevelt also specialized in the aforementioned “politics of
gesture”; what he means is that Roosevelt would make various gestures, such as
support of resettlement that would placate the Jews and the leaders.
Feingold’s analysis of the American Jewish response is consistent with what will
be seen in the other works—namely that Jews in America were in a precarious
position, lacking any considerable influence on the government and worried about
anti-Semitic backlash. In explaining the response, Feingold cites a number of factors,
including this lack of influence, a lack of credibility on all the reports coming out of
Germany, and the belief in a spirit of civilization that simply did not exist as the
reason’s for American Jews’ inaction in response to their European brethren. In
contrast to Wyman, who does not excuse the American Jews but places a greater
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share of guilt on Roosevelt and the government, Feingold believes that American
Jewish groups and leaders should be held accountable for not doing enough in terms
of relief efforts, as he attributed much of America’s underwhelming response to the,
“failure of skill and power which was the cause of the lack of American Jewry
success”.12
During the 1980’s, opinions regarding the American response to Holocaust
evolved; as more primary sources became available, new books and opinions
pertaining to the Holocaust were released. Similar to Feingold, Leon Weliczker
Wells, in his work, Who Speaks for the Vanquished?: American Jewish Leaders and
the Holocaust, was able to provide a unique vantage point, in that he was a prisoner
during the war, and a key witness in the Nazi war crime trials.13Such experience holds
considerable weight in any account or opinion. Using archives from the New York
Times, Wells is able to also illustrate what could have been done to prevent and save
thousands of lives that were lost. It is always dangerous for historians to play the
“what-if game” but in Wells’ case, the suggestions he makes were plausible and
easily could have been performed. Wells identifies a list of four steps that could have
affected what happened. One such step was arousing world opinion to the Nazis.
Wells describes this step in writing:
The first responsibility of world Jewish leaders and organizations was to gather
and publicize all of the measures taken by the Nazis as they occurred. This
accurate information would have been the basis for all lobbying with
governments, and for specific aims, and actions with regard to counteracting Nazi
policy vis a vis Jews.14
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Among other steps that could have been taken, Wells believed that an effort should
have been made to reward rescuers, and simply, that Jewish Organizations should
have put forth a greater and more direct effort.15 The author ultimately expresses
resignation that more was not done but does conclude with what can be done in the
future. Wells’s analysis is particularly helpful as it sheds light on the actual goals of
the leading Zionist groups, and where there priorities were.
Wells’s work was largely critical of the Hadassah, the largest Zionist organization
in the United States, and the American and World Jewish Congress, and their reaction
to what was occurring in Europe. Wells posits that the Zionists used the tragedies
inflicted upon European Jewry as reasoning for forming an independent Jewish state,
and that they could not do anything that would have helped the Jews in Europe. In
fact, the Zionists became active when it came time to bring Jews to Palestine. Wells’s
research also touches on the anti-Semitism prevalent throughout the United States,
and various accounts that testify to the fact that any Jewish led movement could have
done more harm than good, particularly in regards to anti-Semitic backlash.
In his book, American Anti-Nazi Resistance, 1933-1941: A Historical Analysis,
published in 1982, Moshe Gottlieb analyzed the Anti-Nazi boycott that took place in
America, and its effects in both Germany and America.16 In contrast to other authors,
Gottlieb showed American Jews unifying in a common cause, in this case, a boycott
against German goods. He traces the boycott’s origins, citing Germany’s boycott of
Jewish goods as a spark that caused it all. Gottlieb’s work differs from his
contemporaries in that his boycott analysis details the economic impact and
15
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repercussions of the war, as well as the possibility of using the boycott as a way to
pressure the German government. Gottlieb used primary sources to illustrate, in
particular, the German government’s fear of the potential economic impact of the
boycott. There was a palpable fear that the German economy would be crippled as a
result. Gottlieb also shed light on the efforts of various Jewish groups in America,
especially those that promoted the boycott, such as the American Jewish Congress
and the Zionist Organization of America. What is clear is the sense of belief amongst
Jewish groups that a boycott would work to curtail German proclamations and actions
against German Jews.
Despite the boycott efforts, Gottlieb projected a sense of failure in that the Jewish
groups failed to unite all America in the boycott efforts; more importantly was the
failure of all of the American Jewish community to form “a united boycott front”.
Regardless, Gottlieb demonstrates that the boycott had a negative impact on
Germany; unfortunately it also prompted German backlash as evidenced by how, “the
Nazis magnified the ‘Jewish boycott’ by claiming that Jews were merely the avantgarde of a general conspiracy by the democratic world”.17 In spite of the Nazi’s
comments on the boycott, Jews still felt a sense of dignity in what was one of the few
acts of solidarity. Gottlieb includes a comment from Dr. Joseph L. Tenenbaum that
illustrates the Jews’ “pride in having given the initiative to such a great and common
human struggle for freedom and democracy”.18
Among the strongest and most critical of the opinions of the general American
response, particularly that of the federal government, that came out was David
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Wyman’s work, published in 1987, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the
Holocaust 1941-1945.19 At this point in time, it was fairly established that the United
States government had multiple opportunities to offer help or aid to European Jews,
and for various reasons, mostly politically influenced, and did not. Wyman’s account
differs from others because of the blame and culpability he places at the feet of the
United States government. This is not uncommon in history books but the degree and
passion with which Wyman attacks the government sets him apart from his
counterparts. Among the major points the author used in his criticism were their
policy on immigration, the lack of pressure in shaping public opinion from both the
government and the media, and the decision not to bomb Auschwitz and its railroads.
Unlike Feingold, Wyman has a singular focus on where the blame should be placed—
the U.S. government. He pardons American Jewish leaders and organizations, writing
that they worked to spread information about what was occurring in Europe but could
not sustain a united drive for Government action, as they were too politically weak.
Wyman's account also differs from scholars more critical of the American Jewish
response in that he defends the actions and steps taken by Rabbi Wise during the
process, expressing an understanding of the precariousness of the position Wise held
both with the Jewish people and the government, and the difficulty of appealing to the
needs and requirements of both sides. That being said, Wyman does cite the lack of
leadership in the American Jewish Community as a major reason in their ineffective
response; health issues and the aforementioned balancing act beset Wise, and Rabbi
Abba Hillel Silver was more concerned with postwar Jewish statehood. Wyman also
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criticizes the lack of unified action throughout the war, including infighting between
non-Zionist groups. Zionists differed in intention, focusing on establishing a Jewish
homeland, rather than responding to the Nazi actions. Describing this rift, Wyman
puts forth that, “American Jewish leaders recognized that the best hope for rescue lay
in a strong effort to induce the U.S. government to act…their effectiveness was
severely limited by their failure to create a united Jewish movement and by their lack
of sustained action.”20
Published in 1995, Feingold’s work, Bearing Witness: How America and its Jews
Responded to the Holocaust, while an extension of his 1966 work, delves further into
the response of American Jews and the reasons behind their general ineffectiveness.21
In the intervening years, more information came out about the Holocaust. Feingold’s
further analysis reveals discord amongst the leading Jewish groups and leaders during
the Holocaust, which was consistent with most other works from the 1980’s. Feingold
provides an analysis of the roles of Felix Frankfurter, then a Supreme Court Justice,
and Henry Morgenthau, then the Secretary of the Treasury, who held considerable
influence with the President. He also examined the role of Rabbi Stephen Wise, who
was caught between serving the Jewish people versus maintaining the good will of
President Roosevelt. What is readily apparent, and this will become a common theme
in this analysis, is that influential Jewish officials were reluctant to speak out against
what was occurring, mainly fearing that they would come across as putting their
religion before being “American”, which would alienate both their associates and
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constituents.22 Feingold ends this work with the same question that he posed in
Politics of Rescue, asking who should bear the guilt for the Holocaust? With more
time, Feingold still spreads the blame. On one hand, saving the Jews did not fit in
with the objectives of the United States at the time. On the other, dysfunction
amongst the Jewish groups led to minimal impact or influence on the actions of the
Federal Government. Feingold again mentions that false belief in civilization, in
brotherhood, that simply did not exist.
Haskel Lookstein’s work, Were We our Brother’s Keepers: The Public Response
of American Jews to the Holocaust, deals more directly with the question at hand.23
Lookstein touches on common themes that are prevalent throughout in any work
covering the subject—Jewish admiration of Roosevelt, and anti-Semites downplaying
what was actually happening. In dealing with the subject, Rabbi Lookstein is able to
shed considerable light on the particular topic of this thesis. Lookstein researches six
separate events and the corresponding response of American Jews. In the Jewish
press, Lookstein discerns differing degrees of alarm after Kristallnacht, the wellpublicized pogrom in which the Nazis destroyed Jewish businesses, homes, and
synagogues, and corralled and deported thirty thousand Jews. Some publications,
such as Rabbi Wise’s Opinion or the Contemporary Jewish Record were absorbed in
what occurred. Others such as the Jewish Telegraphic Agency or the Hadassah
Newsletter made little mention of what happened, instead focusing on other issues.
Lookstein touches upon Zionist sentiments, and the debate that raged within
Zionist ranks: an independent Jewish state or rescue of European Jews. There was
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also a common sense of disbelief, particularly at the possibility of the “Final
Solution”; not just among Jews, but nationwide, there was a sense that something so
horrible and drastic could never actually be carried out. In analyzing the lack of
Jewish response, Lookstein, as mentioned earlier, writes that the lack of unity, the
disorganization, and the lack of a central message, put no pressure whatsoever on
Roosevelt, and essentially shaped his response.
More recently, Gulie Arad published her work, America, Its Jews, and the Rise of
Nazism, which reflects a more measured point of view that comes with the ebb and
flow of scholarly opinion.24 Arad’s book discusses the history of Jews in America,
and how it affected their response to the Holocaust. More than anything, Arad’s work
reveals the persistence of anti-Semitism throughout the history of the United States,
and how the desire to “Americanize” shaped the response of Jewish leaders during
the Holocaust. Arad plays devil’s advocate at times, offering a reason for the lack of
Jewish response and the factors surrounding it. Different from her predecessors, Arad
is largely critical of Rabbi Wise; the general impression that she gives is that Wise
was seen as a pawn by the United States government to appease the Jewish
constituency, and by the Jews in America as a figurehead obsessed with his standing
in the eyes of the government.
As with any historic event, the subsequent reactions and opinions that are formed
are constantly evolving. As time progresses, so do the resources we have that are
readily available for research. The Holocaust itself was momentous in its impact—the
damage it caused still resonates today. It is the natural tendency today for us in
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today’s society to look back at history and think that we know better. In this case, it is
no different. There are countless explanations for what the American government
could have done better, or for what the Jewish groups and leaders could have done
better. It is easy to fall into that trap. However, as the historical accounts of what
occurred have come to the forefront, it has provided a much clearer picture. As it
became more of a topic, there was a tendency amongst others to lean strongly towards
one way or the other. As authors have gained greater access, through increased
archives and findings from the principal figures, there has been more of a tendency to
offer valid points to each side, and reasons for and against the decided action. Most
important however, has been how the authors have evolved. Hindsight allows them to
go back and correct or supplement one of their original beliefs. It allows them to add
information when necessary, as well as introduce new sources that have come out
since the release of their works. Analyzing the response to the Holocaust is a
complicated undertaking, rife with political intrigue and influences. Using the
resources available, the works that chronicle this topic vary in degree and focus. Each
author provides their own spin on this controversial issue, some sharing similar
views, and others differing greatly; what is constant, however, is a sense of
acknowledgment that more could have been done.
This thesis does not intend to criticize or castigate anyone individual or group for
what took place. It is common and tantalizing to look back on history and place it in
the context of the time we live in, leading us to lament that more should have been
done or what should not have been done. I will try to avoid that trap as much as
possible in this work. My goal is to analyze why American Jewish groups could not
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find a common position, and how the tension and differences in opinion helped to
shape the overall lack of response, from the Jews to the federal government. At first,
American Jewry was paralyzed by fear of anti-Semitic backlash and their tenuous
place in American society. As the war progressed, an ideological divide between
Zionists and non-Zionists developed as the debate raged over what was the more
pressing issue: the establishment of a Jewish homeland or relief efforts for European
Jews; as the war intensified, so did the debate and tensions, leaving American Jewry
unable to rally behind a common cause or accomplish little in the way of influencing
the American government. The Holocaust has been analyzed and covered by almost
every angle in great detail. What is abundantly clear is that it was an atrocity that has
a long lasting impact that resonates today; to learn about the groups involved,
particularly as Americans, and the issues and ideas that affected and impacted their
decision-making of the parties involved provide a template to learn and evolve from.
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Chapter 2- Hitler’s Appointment to Chancellor
In late 1930, Morris Waldman, at the time the executive Vice Secretary of the
American Jewish Committee and later the executive Vice President, published a
report on the Jewish situation in Germany following the time he spent there from June
to September. Waldman titled the report, “The Anti-Semitic Menace in Germany”; in
the report, Waldman sought to, “awaken the Jewish consciousness that many of them
(American Jews) had labored so hard to suppress”.1 Waldman’s report detailed the
National Socialist Party’s proposed solutions to the “Jewish Problem”, and in
particular, the passionately anti-Semitic leanings of the party’s leader, Adolf Hitler.
Waldman emphasized that the goal of the party was a total destruction and expulsion
of the Jewish identity in Germany, with an eventual impact on the rest of European
Jewry. With the report, Waldman, in appealing to the committee, believed that it
could “inform public opinion in the United States regarding anti-Jewish agitation in
Germany, in the hope that a public opinion would be formed in this country which
would have a favorable reaction in Germany.”2
With a nomadic history, and no true homeland, many Jews hoped to gain a
foothold and a place in American society, to blend in and become “American”—
Acting out in protest or cries for help could have jeopardized that goal. Waldman,
realizing the importance of citizenship for American Jews, as well as the prejudicial
climate of the era, had hoped to enlist and appeal to, “general (non-Jewish) public
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opinion against Hitlerism as the solution on the domestic front”.3 What Waldman
found in response was underwhelming support, particularly from American Jewry; in
general, there was an effort to downplay, or even repress Waldman’s findings. What
Waldman could not have foreseen is that such actions served as a mere prelude for a
similar reaction three years later, when Adolf Hitler took power in Germany.
On January 30, 1933, after losing the presidential election as the representative of
the National Socialist German Workers Party in the 1932 election, Adolf Hitler was
appointed the Chancellor of Germany. His appointment marked a shift in power in the
German government, and the gradual change in the German beliefs and identity. With
Hitler’s ascension, Hermann Göring was made Minister of the Interior of Prussia, and
Wilhelm Frick, Minister of the Interior, helping to consolidate Hitler’s power, giving
him total control of the German government. Before his ascension, Hitler served in
the German Army during World War I, and became a full time member of the
Workers Party in 1921. It was as a member of the party where Hitler found skill as an
orator, as his propaganda against the Treaty of Versailles, Marxists, and Jews gained
him a huge following in the party. In 1924, after leading an attempt to take power
from the German government, Hitler was sentenced to five years in prison.4 It was in
prison that Hitler wrote his famous work, Mein Kampf, where Hitler detailed his
beliefs in Aryan purity, and the threat posed by world Jewry and communism.5
By the time of his election as Chancellor, Hitler’s name was well known in
America, as well as his beliefs. His rise to Chancellor was a mere prelude to total
control of the German government. American Jewish groups and leaders were
3
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conscious that this was an issue that merited their attention. Key questions to consider
however include: Did they fully comprehend the situation? What factors helped shape
their reaction? And finally, why, at the most critical time in the history of their
people, was there a collective failure to act from American Jewry and why the dire
situation did not merit their full attention? Answering these questions helps to
illustrate an American Jewish base that, at this point, was largely paralyzed by the
fear of provoking anti-Semitic backlash, both in the United States and in Germany.
1933 in the United States was a time of great turmoil and struggle. At the time
President-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt was to be inaugurated, the American
economy fell to its lowest point in history. Many American Jews, daily life was a
struggle to hold the tenuous position that they maintained in the culture and society.
Many Jews strived to present themselves as Americans first, and Jews second. In
1933, Waldman wrote of the “liberal fantasy” of the Jewish people, as they were,
“convinced that by demonstrating ‘good behavior’ conforming to and abiding by the
rules and mores that defined the reference group, they would gain acceptance as well
as access to the power and status of that group”.6 Most of the concern surrounding
Hitler stemmed from his anti-Semitic rhetoric; no notable violence had been taken up
against German Jewry to that point. However, there was a palpable fear among
American Jewish groups that public criticism of Hitler and the Nazi regime would
lead to anti-Semitic backlash in Germany. Coupled with the anti-Semitic fears that
Jews faced domestically, and their tenuous foothold in the American consciousness,
immediate action or protestation was deemed inadvisable by American Jews. Overall,
this passive response to Hitler’s appointment from American Jewry, helped to foster a
6
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general consensus across the country that, “in 1933, Hitlerism was not perceived by
the general American public as a serious threat to the Jews in Germany”.7
Soon after Hitler’s ascension to Chancellor, American Jewish leaders and groups
identified him as a major threat to Jewish existence. Despite this knowledge, an
ideological divide existed amongst the American Jewry, between the extreme and
fervent supporters of Zionism, and those who were moderate, or even against the
Zionist initiative. From a Zionist perspective, a move towards establishing a Jewish
homeland in Palestine was the major goal. The moderates and non-Zionists took an
approach of quiet diplomacy, resisting making any overtly public actions. To this
point, Hitler had not truly established himself as a legitimate threat—to divert any
resources or attention was not necessary in the eyes of many ardent Zionists. Jews
who were more in line with the moderate point of view acknowledged the threat, but
were also not overly concerned.
At this time, there were a number of major Jewish groups and leaders that differed
in goal and intention. The American Jewish Committee was among the more
prominent groups for American Jewry. Established in 1906 to prevent further antiSemitism in Russia, it began to make an impact in the United States behind the
leadership of Louis Marshall until his death in 1929; in the 1930’s and 1940’s, by
President Cyrus Adler, Morris Waldman, and James Marshall were the group’s
principal leaders.8 The group could be classified as being comprised of moderate
Zionists and non- Zionists. Relative to the situation of German Jews and the problems
posed by Hitler, the Committee exemplified the inaction that came to plague
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American Jewry throughout the rise of Nazi Germany. An organization that worked
closely with the Committee was B’nai B’rith, which was founded as a service and
fraternal organization but later evolved into a group based on educational work for
Jewish immigrants and defending Jewish rights. Similar to the American Jewish
Committee, the organization aimed “for neutrality in political affairs, but a trend
toward Zionism was gathering strength in its ranks during World War II.”9 While
more activist than the American Jewish Committee, the B’nai B’rith could also be
described as moderate in terms of Zionistic passions.
Among the most political and passionate of these groups was the American
Jewish Congress, led for many years by its president and prominent Jewish voice,
Rabbi Stephen S. Wise. With a strong Zionist leaning, the Congress was the most
politically active of the three major groups in the United States, being more willing
than others to express public dissatisfaction. In 1936, with the help of prominent
Zionist, Nahum Goldmann, Wise established the World Jewish Congress. Another
faction at the heart of the American Jewish society, the Joint Distribution Committee,
was among the most active in terms of relief efforts; as anti-Jewish violence began to
increase, the group had locations in the United States and across Europe, through
which they helped transport refugees from Germany to a safer place. The
Committee’s efforts became critical following Hitler’s appointment as the group
helped lead numerous early emigration efforts. However, as will be illustrated later,
the Committee often clashed with both the American and World Jewish Congresses,
and often competed for funding against the more Zionist groups.
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The overall ineffectiveness from leading Jewish groups was apparent soon after
Hitler’s appointment. On February 12, 1933, almost two weeks after Hitler’s
appointment, the American Jewish Committee identified a growing problem in
Germany; in particular the topic at hand was, “the likelihood of anti-Jewish action
being taken by the present government and by the government which would come
into power following the elections of March 5”.10 It was common knowledge that the
upcoming elections were a mere precursor to Hitler having total control of the
German government. But despite mounting evidence of growing anti-Jewish
sentiment in Germany, the Committee decided to take a wait and see approach.
Senator Alfred Cohen believed that the best course of action would be for the
Committee, B’nai B’rith and the American Jewish Congress to simply work together
to gather information about the German problem, believing that if “the three pooled
their information and exchanged views, beneficial action may be possible.”11 A sign
of unity would have been a major sign and step for the American Jewish community,
in part because of how the groups were divided ideologically.
The groups agreed that Hitler’s rhetoric and beliefs could be tempered if the
federal government, with help from the American press, were to get involved and
denounce what he stood for. Hitler already had a representative in Washington D.C.,
who was going on radio broadcasts, “endeavoring to create the impression that the
entire American people is sympathetic to Hitlerism”.12 In the conference between the
three organizations, Nathan Perlman of the American Jewish Congress illustrated
10
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how the government could affect Hitler and Nazism. He believed that newspapers and
editorials would have little effect or influence in Germany. However, public opinion
shaped by a rebuke from a governmental official had potential to hold influence in
Germany. Perlman put forth, that the only thing that would get Hitler’s attention,
“will be the attitude of the American government. This attitude will be shaped by
public opinion, and for effective public opinion non-Jewish publicity will be much
more helpful than Jewish propaganda”.13 No senator was going to comment until the
March 5 elections played out however; Hitler’s popularity was rising and American
antagonism would be akin to pouring gasoline on the fire. The potential that a public
rebuke could incite violence in Germany was enough to dissuade any prominent
figure, Jewish or governmental, from making any immediate comment. The groups
believed that attacking Hitler and his dictatorship would accomplish nothing,
“because at the present moment the movement in the direction of dictatorship is
popular”.14 American Jewish organizations and the government were in a holding
pattern; they believed publicly criticizing him and his movement would only
strengthen the anti-Semitic fervor in Germany. Yet despite these concerns, there was
still a sense of empathy into the viability of the Nazi movement, as many leading
American Jews believed the, “Nazi regime was…manageable. Those elements that
were deemed most threatening, such as the economic restrictions imposed on Jews,
were dismissed as totally untenable and irrational.”15
In the following months, the American Jewish Committee continued its politically
inactive approach. The March 9 meeting of the board of directors discussed the
13
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viability of a joint public statement with B’nai B’rith regarding the “German
Situation”. Here, the position of the American Jewish Committee became apparent. In
discussing a public demonstration, the Committee argued:
All the American Jewish Committee can do just now is to refrain from
participating in public agitation and endeavor, wherever possible, to dissuade
other groups from participating…We should cooperate with other organizations
so long as such cooperation is not incompatible with our own views.16
Throughout the duration of the war, this “hands-off” approach would become the
signature of the Committee. This belief is symptomatic of what contributed to the
friction between the different Jewish groups; a central reason for this discord was
because the leading American Jewish groups held differed in beliefs. Zionist
extremists and moderates, and their respective leaders differed in how to respond
throughout the war.
In a later correspondence, Wise was also critical of the American Jewish
Committee. In describing Germany post-election, in a later to his friend, Professor
Richard Gotheill, Wise wrote, “it really is an unutterable tragedy. We are having
trouble with the American Jewish Committee. They want us to be quiescent for they
think that nothing should be done and that there is danger of blundering”. Later in the
exchange of letters, Wise told Gotheill that, “we feel something must be done. You
cannot imagine the feeling that rages through the country…four millions and more
Jews in America have a real purchasing power”.17 While Wise would later be accused
of being a “puppet” of the federal government, as well as decrease in stature in the
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Zionist community, Wise was passionately involved both as a Zionist and as a
American. The Rabbi deemed action necessary at first, but began to change as he
began to regularly correspond with President Roosevelt. In hopes of currying favor
and being looked on positively by the President, Wise began to fall in line with the
messages of the government and toned down his rhetoric and beliefs.
Wise’s words painted a picture of an America that was up in arms, particularly the
Jewish community. Despite being up in arms, the leading Jewish groups could not
agree on the nature of how to respond. Led by Wise, the American Jewish Congress
believed a boycott could cripple the German economy. Moderate groups like the
American Jewish Committee and B’nai B’rith did not want to attract negative
attention to themselves through public demonstrations or protests.
The specter of Hitler as chancellor was not lost on Wise either. Rabbi Wise shared
many of his concerns Gotheill. In a letter to the Professor, Wise wrote:
We are all terribly disturbed about Hitlerism. How sickening to read your word
“the French Jews are disturbed at Hitlerism as Frenchmen, not as Jews”. The
nations can deal with Hitler, the Chancellor, but how hard for us in dealing with
Hitler, the Judeophobe. The dreams of Delagarde and von Treitschke are now
come to realization. More and more I begin to see, excepting for the work one is
permitted to do and excepting for such joy as comes from one’s nearest, it is not
so easy to be alive, more especially seeing that there is so much unclean and
indecent in Jewish life.18
Wise’s concerns mirror and help to shed light on a major reason for Jewish activity.
In France, Jews were concerned about Hitler as countrymen, not because of their
religion; in the United States, many Jews acted as Americans first in terms of how to
respond to Hitler, putting their Jewish identity to a minor, secondary role. Wise
sensed that many Jews were going to be hesitant to respond to this threat. As they put
18
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away their Jewish identities for American identification, and to avoid any antiSemitic conflicts, Wise was concerned that stirring up Jewish passions and support
may be tougher than he anticipated.
The lack of unity amongst the groups was reflected in the relationship between
the groups’ leaders. The aforementioned Rabbi Wise was a prominent voice for the
Jewish people but was wary of angering or losing favor with the Federal government.
Waldman touches on Wise’s worries, as well as the inadvisability of public protest or
action, in a telegram to Judge Alfred Cohen; describing his frustration, Waldman
communicated that “Regret to inform you, despite these appeals and energetic
remonstrances, representatives our committee and B’nai B’rith expressed opposition
Rabbi Wise and other Congress representatives”.19 Waldman was referring to the
suggestion of a planned protest against Hitler, echoing the company line of the
American Jewish Congress, and their reluctance to become politically active.
Regarding this inactivity, Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Goldmann, both heavily
involved with the World Jewish Congress, were consistently agitated at the inability
to get anything resembling a sustained protest in the United States.
Despite efforts of groups such as the American Jewish Congress, many Jewish
groups chose to remain politically inactive. During this inactivity, there was a gradual
evolution and proliferation of the Nazi Party in Germany, as it spread its core tenets
throughout the country. The first concentration camp was established in Dachau. The
camp was no explicitly aimed at Jews at this time; rather, it was motivated more by
political repression than anti-Semitism. Three days later the Enabling Bill was passed.
The bill was particularly problematic because of its nature and intention; the bill
19
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would give Hitler dictatorial power, giving him total control of the German
government. The bill allowed Hitler to pass laws without presidential oversight or
parliamentary oversight, rendering Hindenburg and the Reichstag as largely
ineffective figureheads. Hitler also dissolved all trade unions and sent the leaders to
concentration camps, and effectively banned the Communist Party and the Social
Democratic party, arresting still active members.20
On March 21, the American Jewish Committee received a particularly harrowing
report Hitler’s intentions with the Enabling Bill, and everything that was taking place
against the Jewish populace in Germany. The report indicated that German Jews “are
subjected to a ruthless campaign of terror and intimidation”.21 With this terror and
intimidation, Hitler was putting in a program steeped in anti-Semitic laws and
rhetoric that would nullify the Jews’ rights and privileges in Nazi Germany. His
program established laws for citizenship, requiring that any member of the German
people be of German blood, excluding Jews in this statement. While not expressly
directed at the Jewish population, actions were being taken against them. Jewish
artists were being forcibly removed from their studios or theaters. A cap of seventeen
was placed on the number of Jewish lawyers allowed to perform law in German
courts. Jewish doctors and physicians were being dismissed from urban hospitals and
municipalities, despite having contracts. A nation-wide boycott was taking place
against Jewish merchants and Jewish department stores, despite their profitability,
were shut down. Jewish graveyards were being desecrated and the Swastika flag was
being raised over numerous synagogues throughout the country. Finally, many Jews,
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some of them American citizens, were the victims of violent and heinous attacks
throughout the entire country.22
In response to Hitler’s new program, the first major American Jewish protest took
place at Madison Square Garden, on March 27, 1933. Led by the American Jewish
Congress, and Rabbi Wise, the Congress gathered to protest and voice their
displeasure with the anti-Jewish actions being taken in Germany. At the protest, Wise
spoke of the need for unity at the protest, saying, “We must speak up like men. How
can we ask our Christian friends to speak up against the wrongs suffered by Jews if
we keep silent? It is not the German Jews who are being attacked. It is the Jews”.23 In
describing the Madison Square Garden protest, the New York Times wrote, “More
than 250,000 Jews in the city will join in protest meetings today…The protest in this
city will center in a rally in Madison Square Garden to be addressed by leaders of the
Jewry and the Christian world.”24
In light of what had occurred up to this point, the American Jewish Committee
and B’nai B’rith felt that a joint public statement denouncing Hitlerism would be the
most effective tool in the fight against Nazi Germany. In the joint public statement,
the two groups came together and said:
The American Jewish Committee and the B’nai B’rith express their horror at the
anti-Jewish action in Germany which is denying to German Jews the fundamental
rights of every human being in a spirit contrary to the traditions of American
freedom of conscience, religion, and liberty. The events of the past few weeks in
Germany have filled with indignation, not only American Jews, but also
22
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Americans of every other faith. The conscience of the civilized world is aroused
against this reversion to medieval barbarism.25
Through the public statement, the two groups conveyed their dismay to what was
taking place; hopefully the American public would take notice and be horrified at
what was taking place in Germany, and rally support and public opinion in hopes of
influencing governmental action.
Unsurprisingly, the joint statement had little impact on what took place in
Germany. In a meeting that took place on April 9, Judge Joseph Proskauer, a
prominent member of the American Jewish Committee, said that, “the situation in
Germany now warrants a more fundamental and comprehensive attack”.26 Proskauer
proposed a movement should be started to protest what was taking place but that the
group should be made up of “predominantly non-Jews”. This echoes the sentiment of
wanting to be American first; a group led by mostly Jews would not be well received
across the United States, as anti-Semitic tensions were high at that point. A group led
by non-Jews would hold more weight. However, choosing a leader for said group was
a task in itself. The leader of the group could not be someone who sympathized with
what was happening to Jews, but rather someone who was against anti-Semitism, thus
projecting a general feeling that would be shared by all Americans.
Similar to the American Jewish Committee and B’nai B’rith, the Joint
Distribution Committee expressed a comparable level of concern over the
appointment of the new Chancellor. The group, which had offices throughout Europe
including Germany, actually had first hand experience of the aggressive tactics that
25
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would become the norm in Germany. The committee dealt with an attempt from
officers in Hitler’s Germany to strong-arm them, and exploit them for speaking out or
undertaking actions against the country. On April 19, 1933, in the European
Executive offices of the committee in Berlin, five men, three of whom were S.S.
officers, broke into the office, and searched through the various rooms, and
eventually taking, “a number of books, documents, correspondence, etc., from each
room”.27 The S.S., also known as the Schutzstaffel, was a military organization under
the direction of Hitler’s right hand man, Heinrich Himmler.
Two days later, with both Aaron Levy and Gertrud Schwarz, the Joint
Distribution Committee Members present, two officers arrived, “there to make a
search of our office records, quite independent of what had happened previously”.
What the two men found was that the search was prompted by information the
officers had received that the office contained, “printed and other material of an
objectionable character to the German government”. The illegal search, and the
subsequent legal one, illustrated the shift in power and government that was taking
place and clearly evident. Adolf Hitler was not going to allow anyone to speak
against his aims and goals, and those who did would be persecuted for it. In their
summary of what took place, the two men write that, “we do not believe that the raid
on the night of April 19th was made under proper authority”, further illustrating the
sense of impunity permeating throughout Germany.28
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The Joint Distribution was among the most active of the Jewish groups, and was
in constant contact with the State Department. On April 4th, a letter written by the
secretary of the Joint Distribution Committee, Joseph Hyman, illustrated a greater
understanding of what was taking place, as well as sharp criticism aimed at the
American Jewish Committee. He intended to inform Undersecretary of State William
Phillips, of what was taking place, using, “several cables from an unimpeachable
source on the situation in Germany”. Hyman described the issues in Germany in
writing of the “fundamental problem developing from the dislocation of business and
trade and which Jews have been engaged”. Hyman described the feedback provided
from the cables as, “ominous in the extreme”; in his meeting with Pierrepont Moffat,
who was in charge State Department, Moffat , “was impressed with the gravity of the
situation which had made us feel that we should have to move our office to Paris or
elsewhere”. Hitler’s Germany was becoming an unwelcome place for the Jewish
religion. He also touched on the difficulty Jews had in leaving Germany, a situation
compounded by the strict border patrol as well as the less than favorable quota system
put in place by the United States government, which made entry next to impossible
for many. Hyman’s correspondence reveals the troubling knowledge of growing antiSemitic actions in Germany, adding to an abundant amount of evidence already being
compiled.29
Hyman was also critical of the American Jewish Committee, and he was
particularly up in arms over their quiet diplomacy approach in response to what was
taking place. In describing the American Jewish Committee’s involvement, Hyman
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mentioned the American Jewish Committee’s policy towards public protests or
actions, writing that they were, “against any demonstrations or talk of retaliation,
boycott, etc.” and that the, “most effective voice would come on the score of
humanity from non-partisan and non-Jewish sources”.30 Similar to Wise’s opinion of
the American Jewish Committee, Hyman decried their overall passivity, the hope
essentially that things would resolve themselves that emanated from the Committee,
particularly in contrast to the actions being taken by the Joint Distribution Committee.
Despite an increasingly alarming situation, little was done on the American
Jewish front in response. The American Jewish Committee continued its laissez faire
approach to the situation, preferring to place their belief in the Federal government,
and support any actions they deemed necessary. B’nai B’rith and the Joint
Distribution Committee continued to attempt their relief efforts, whether putting out
informational pamphlets castigating Germany or more actively helping to transport
Jewish refugees from Germany, with minimal funding or support. The American
Jewish Congress, established and led by Rabbi Wise, and the World Jewish Congress,
also established by Wise but also Nahum Goldmann and Chaim Weizmann,
continued its proactive approach.
Other leading Zionist groups, like the Zionist Organization of America and the
Hadassah, began to increase the rhetoric of a Jewish homeland as the overriding goal
that all Jews needed to look toward, especially in a time of persecution for their
people. At this point, the Nazi movement was in its fledgling stages, and no one
foresaw what was to come. In the eyes of many Zionists, nothing could take
precedence over the establishment of a Jewish homeland—they believed that all
30
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funding and resources should be directed to creating Israel, and providing a place for
Jews all over the world to call home. Moderate Zionists and Non-Zionists were of the
belief that the situation at hand merited their attention—while understanding of how
integral a Jewish homeland could be, it also a distant goal at this point, especially in
light of the growing threat in Germany.
The different approaches of the Jewish groups manifested itself in discontent and
discordance amongst the different groups and leaders. A unified approach or
message could not be reached because the groups would not compromise from their
core tenets or beliefs. In the following years, the gulf between the groups would only
grow. In a 1934 letter to Nahum Goldmann, then the President of the World Jewish
Congress, Rabbi Wise, in addressing what the main focus of the Zionist collective
should be, commented on the extreme Zionist perspective, writing:
The Zionists need to be reconciled…It is his (Justice Brandeis) view that the focus of
whatever we do must be Palestine and democracy, and I share that view. I think that
the Congress, when held, could be employed to supplement, in terms of the attitude of
general Jewry, rather than Zionist Jewry, the demand for the Open Door in
Palestine.31
Wise’s concerns over inner strife amongst Zionists compounded the numerous issues
plaguing American Jewry at the time. Wise also expressed dismay at the
“Americanizing” taking place with many Jews, which was tied to concerns about
anti-Semitism, writing, “Our people, especially the well-to-do ones, as usual are
much more influenced by what the Goyim think than what is good or right for Jews,”
an interesting viewpoint considering the lengths that Wise went through to maintain
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his good standing in the eyes of Roosevelt.32 At this point, the palpable fear amongst
American Jewry was that speaking out against Hitler would provoke anti-Semitic
backlash. This paralysis would continue throughout the war in many ways, but would
eventually be overshadowed by larger issues. While there was inner strife amongst
American Jewish groups, along ideological lines, the division would become
cavernous as the years progressed, as the issue of Jewish refugees and how to help
them and where to send them came to the forefront.
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Chapter 3- Kristallnacht and the Collective American Jewish Reaction
By 1938, anti-Semitism, as well as German Expansionism, was becoming
increasingly prevalent in Germany. That March, Germany blatantly violated the
Treaty of Versailles as they took over Austria without bloodshed and made it part of
the German republic. As the Nazi persecution intensified, and more Jews attempted to
leave Germany, President Roosevelt convened what came to be known as the Evian
Conference, a meeting that included representatives from thirty-two countries and
representatives from relief organizations was held to discuss the German-Jewish
refugee situation. At the conference, all the representatives expressed sympathy for
what was taking place, and there was a general belief that a long-term solution needed
to be created. Despite this shared belief, many countries, including the United States,
would not ease their draconian immigration restrictions, fearing that an influx of
immigrants would cause economic distress for their respective citizens; there was a
belief in the United States, still feeling the effects of the Great Depression, that the
Jewish refugees would take away jobs and overwhelm social programs designed for
assistance. At the end of the conference, only the Dominican Republic decided to
open their doors to more refugees. For the German government, they relished the
opportunity to identify hypocrisy in these countries, stating that, “it was astounding
that foreign countries criticized Germany for their treatment of the Jews, but none of
them wanted to open their doors when the opportunity offered”.1
Further complicating matters was the conduct of the Jewish representatives at the
conference. The manner in which the Jews in attendance conducted themselves at the
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Evian Conference painted a picture of a disjointed dynamic between the groups. In a
letter to Wise, Goldman, who was in attendance, wrote:
All the Jewish organizations came to Evian, swarmed around like bees and made
a very bad impression on the Conference and the press. If ever a lesson for the
necessity of Jewish united representation was given, it was done in Evian. But I
am afraid that Jewish notables have learnt nothing from this lesson.2
Goldmann later decried the fact that the idea of Palestine as a refuge for Jews was not
well received at the conference. The disjointed nature that permeated throughout the
conference was a troubling sign for all involved, including the Jewish groups as well
as the governments present. Of the leading nations involved, the conference came off
as more of a grand gesture than accomplishing anything of substance; there was
discussion of ways to help the persecuted Jews but nothing was actually done. Chaim
Weizmann lamented this passivity in a letter to Rabbi Wise, writing, “The Conference
appears to have limited its scope very severely, and there is apparently not much cooperation between the private organizations and the Government”.3 Weizmann and
Goldmann, leaders of the World Jewish Congress, were not alone in their assessment
of the conduct of the Jews at the Evian Conference. In an American Jewish
Committee report, a similar sentiment is displayed. Writing of the lack of unity that
was evident amongst the different Jewish groups, the report said:
It is not easy to draw a moral from the result of these meetings of Jewish
organisations, but the difficulty in getting any sort of agreement and the insistence on
points of disagreement rather than points of accord among Jewish organisations must
have proved a spectacle far from edifying to the non-Sectarian organisations also
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present. I think it was just at this period in the Conference that somebody discovered
that Evian written backwards becomes “naïve”.4
Even though there was a general acknowledgement of the need to help the Jewish
refugees, the apparent lack of cohesion amongst the Jewish groups helped foster a
disappointing response to the present issue. To many, the Conference, in actuality,
was a “resounding fiasco and did great harm to German Jews.”5 In the end, the
participating countries would eventually come to regret their refusal to create more
palatable immigration standards, and the Jewish organizations would come to regret
their behavior and inability to coax a solution out of the representatives involved, as a
few months later, in November, the virulent anti-Semitism towards Jews would
explode.
On November 7, a German diplomat, Enrst vom Rath, was assassinated in France
by a German-Jewish youth, Herschel Grynszpan; the youth was incensed following
the forced deportation of his father, mother, sister and brother from their home in
Hanover to Poland. Before they were forcibly removed, his sister was able to send a
telegram, which upon receiving it, left Grynszpan, in France at the time, enraged. The
following day, Grynszpan went to the German Embassy in Paris and shot the Von
Rath, who had come down to assist him. For the Nazis, a diplomat’s death at the
hands of a Jew was the perfect excuse to launch “a night of anti-Semitic excesses.”
Goebbels defined Von Rath’s death as a Jewish conspiracy, initiating pogroms and
leading to “spontaneous riots” throughout the country. Despite the appearance of
spontaneity, the soldiers and rioters were given certain guidelines, such as not

4
5

“Inter-Governmental Conference on Refugees Held at Evian,” July 6 th 1938, 2-3, AJCA, New York, NY.
Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, (New York: Viking,
1963), 66.

38
endangering non-Jewish life or property, not endangering foreigners (even Jewish
foreigners), and to remove all archival material from synagogues. The S.S. was
ordered to arrest as many Jews as possible. The pogrom’s collective damage resulted
in the destruction of 267 synagogues and over 7,500 Jewish-owned shops and stores.
Many Jewish cemeteries were desecrated, and the attacks were especially destructive
in the cities with the highest population of Jews, Berlin and Vienna. Over 36,000
Jewish males were arrested and sent to various concentration camps such as Dachau
or Buchenwald.6
Kristallnacht marks the first occasion where Jews were incarcerated and
persecuted on such a grand scale, solely because they were Jewish. In the following
days, German officials and leaders capitalized on what had occurred, and began
taking steps to eliminate Jews and their “perceived influence” from Germany. In the
days and weeks following Kristallnacht, laws and decrees were put forth that
“deprived Jews of their property and of their means of livelihood.” Much of this
property, as well as the destroyed businesses, were transferred to Aryan “ownership,”
for cheaper than their actual costs. Other laws made Jews ineligible for employment
in both the public and private sector, while Jewish children were expelled from
German schools. Use of public transportation was restricted, and Jews were banned
from theaters, cinemas or concert halls. The events of Kristallnacht and the
subsequent actions taken by the Nazi government set off a powder keg of anti-
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Semitism and anti-Jewish policies that resulted in the singular goal of full removal of
Jewish life in Germany in the following years.7
It was no secret that anti-Semitic tensions in the days and months prior to
Kristallnacht were reaching a boiling point. With representatives in their various
offices abroad, the Joint Distribution Committee was aware of the increasing vitriol
and was attempting to communicate this information with other leading Jewish
groups. In a letter to Joseph Hyman, Morris Troper noted that, “Even before the
assassination in Paris, the situation of the Jews in Germany was extremely acute…the
moment of complete Jewish unemployment had come into view.”8 Later in his letter,
Troper speculated on the uncertain future that lay ahead for European Jewry. It was
becoming clear that in essence, the clock was ticking on German Jewry. By January
1, the German government hoped that, “all Jewish stores and artisan enterprises must
be Aryanised or liquidated…There will be nothing left of Jewish wealth after
payment for the repair of stores and homes and the collection of the billion mark
fine”.9
The Joint Distribution Committee was proactive in its condemnation of the events
however, publishing newspapers and flyers attacking the Nazi government. The
Committee put out a joint flyer with both Christian and Jewish groups alike for the
general American public—included in the flyer was the American Committee for
Christian German Refugees, the Committee for Catholic Refugees from Germany,
and the United Palestine Appeal. This sign of unity was a form of progress, as the
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groups were coming together against a common enemy, but it is important to point
out that many Jewish groups could not put aside their differences for an act as simple
as putting out a flyer, yet Christian groups managed to do so. While these groups did
in fact unite, it should be noted that the Joint Distribution Committee felt it necessary
to turn to Christian groups for backing. The joint statement was seen as a means of
conveying their angst to a larger mass of people. In regard to the statement, Joint
Distribution Committee member Paul Baerwald, regarding the mass appeal of the
statement, wrote to his fellow members, “What will interest you particularly in this
advertisement is that we are demonstrating to the country that we are in close touch
and cooperation with the organizations for the Catholic and the Protestant refugees”.10
Kristallnacht in many ways served as a wake up call to Jews and Americans
alike—up to that point, there had been an effort to downplay or disregard many of the
reports from abroad. Anti-Semitic leaders downplayed the Nazi treatment of German
Jews. Father Charles Coughlin in particular, became such a popular voice because he
was able to “relate anti-Semitism to economic fears and resentments born of the
Depression”. Following Kristallnacht on a radio broadcast, Coughlin “minimized the
attacks and explained them as a defensive reaction by Germans against Jewishinspired Communism”.11 In the broadcast, given on November 27th, Father Coughlin
not only supported Nazism, but attempts to blame the Jews for the Russian
Revolution of 1917 and link them to Communism, believing that it was Jewish
bankers who helped fund and provide aid to Russia, even citing an American Secret
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Service report. In the speech, Coughlin said, “There is evidence that Jewry is silent on
Communism and reluctant to oppose it. There is the question of so-called antiSemitism, which is really a question of anti-Communism. I am an advocate of
Nazism, when I decry Communism”.12 However, eventually it was revealed that
many of Coughlin’s claims were based on Nazi propaganda. Following this news,
many radio stations demanded a pre-examination of Coughlin’s material to put him
on the air, to which he refused, resulting in many stations to end contact and
association with the Priest.
Rabbi Wise, while sympathetic and dismayed over what had taken place for the
Jews in Germany, had hoped the events of Kristallnacht would stir passions in the
collective American consciousness. In an emotional speech eleven days after
Kristallnacht, given in Carnegie Hall in New York, Wise passionately told his
audience:
I speak in sorrow for the needless unmerited suffering of men, women,
children…for the young German youth who was slain…for the grief crazed lad
who slew…for a people, though you may not understand once great and long
great, the German people, who has been brought low to the deepest depths of
inhumanity…Above all, over the circumstance that it has taken nearly 6 years to
bring home the truth, the bitter tragic truth, to the heart of all mankind, which at
last has come to see and know the truth.13
Wise hoped the events of November 9th and 10th would end the denial and incredulity
that was pervasive across the country; many chose to believe that was being reported
simply could not have possibly occurred. Kristallnacht served to awaken the
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collective American senses. Wise ended the speech reiterating his devout support for
President Roosevelt, and termed what had taken place as not only an attack on the
Jewish religion, but an overall attack on democracy, and as a result, the United States.
Kristallnacht also brought out an indignant reaction from the President—
Roosevelt expressed shock and dismay, and could, “scarcely believe that such things
could occur in a 20th century civilization.”14 The President also recalled the American
ambassador to Germany, Hugh Wilson, in what was portrayed as “sharp slap at the
Nazis”.15 Roosevelt’s swift and angry response was well received—to many Jews, the
President represented their best hope and chance to combat Hitler and Nazi Germany.
The President’s popularity only furthered in the following months, as his castigation
of Germany continued. In an April 1939 “letter” to Adolf Hitler, Roosevelt broached
the possibility of war, telling the dictator, “Heads of great governments in this hour
are literally responsible for the fate of humanity in the coming years…History will
hold them accountable for the lives and happiness of all.”16
Following his swift rebuke, Roosevelt’s name was celebrated in synagogues
throughout the country. But regardless of the reverence he was receiving, Roosevelt’s
actions were more in line with the politics of gesture of which he had come to master.
An effective measure would have been making alterations to the quota system that
limited the number of immigrants to enter the United States. The most that the
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President did in light of the situation was to extend the visitors’ visas of the 12,000 to
15,000 refugees already in the United States.17
The American press, in particular newspapers, were active in reporting the events
of Kristallnacht, and as well as publishing the indignant reaction of many prominent
Americans. On November 13, the New York Times published a public rebuke to
Germany from former President Hoover, as well as the novelist Sinclair Lewis, and
union leader and activist, William Green. In the article, Hoover is quoted as saying
that the actions of the Nazis, “had taken Germany back four and half centuries and
were building their own condemnation by mankind for centuries to come.”18 New
York Times writer Anne O’Hare McCormick also condemned the Nazis, but also saw
what had happened as something that solidified Nazi Germany’s standing as a
legitimate threat in opposition to the American way of life. Published on November
12, McCormick wrote with great trepidation and worry, it “is difficult to write calmly
about what has happened in Germany.” Providing detailed accounts of what took
place, McCormack was dismayed at what has taken place, as she wrote “This
highlights a tragedy more portentous than the tragedy of the Jews. It means that the
millions who detest this brutality have lost the power to protest and that other millions
have no desire to protest because they have been worked on by years of anti-Semitic
propaganda.”19 McCormack’s words were almost a warning, a plea that the United
States become more active in the face of Nazi brutality, a terrible phenomenon that
was only gaining steam.
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Response and coverage from American newspapers was countrywide as well. The
Los Angeles Times bemoaning the hopelessness of the situation German Jews faced as
well as attempting to explain the American collective consciousness in response to
what had occurred, as it wrote
The reason the people of the United States are bewildered as well as horrified at the
official German attacks upon the small minority of Jews who live in that country is
because...there is no other example of a government deliberately and shamelessly
provoking such a violation of ordinary rights against a helpless group living in its
midst.20
In general, there was a consensus feeling of disbelief that permeated throughout the
country. For American newspapers to publish and criticize Nazi Germany could be
interpreted as a step in the positive direction, particularly for American Jewry; it
could have been a vital opportunity for American Jews to capitalize on a chance to
influence public opinion across the country, and gain sympathy for their plight.
However, rather than use this opportunity to help gain support for a relief effort,
American Jewish groups continued with a passive approach.
In the days and weeks following Kristallnacht, the Jewish groups approached the
situation differently. B’nai B’rith took a more active approach, attempting to amplify
its relief efforts in Europe. In receiving reports of what happened, the organization
believed that, “every agency in Jewish life covers, in these difficult days, a record of
despair and usually concludes with fervent pleas for relief or a defense program…The
B’nai B’rith must devote the major part of its energies to implementing techniques for
the relief of a shattered and harried Jewish world.”21 The group put major coverage in
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its newsletter, The National Jewish Monthly, detailing the situation faced by the
Jewish refugees. The newsletter, however, made no call to arms, no requests to make
changes to the current policy towards immigration in the United States, and was
hesitant to make any overt complaints about the stance of the federal government.
Despite good intentions, the overall tenor of Jewish groups did not change that
much. On November 13, the major Jewish organizations met to discuss securing
equal rights for Jews in Germany, as well as with anti-Semitic attacks, but not in
reference to Kristallnacht, and Jewish unemployment. Despite their European
brethren suffering their worst injustice only days earlier, no changes were made in the
agenda to acknowledge the pogroms in Germany. It was suggested that the groups
take a restrained approach, that “there should be no parades, public demonstrations,
or protests by Jews”.22 Wise, in contrast to his more active approach in beliefs in
1933, echoed these sentiments, believing that this quiet approach was the best course
of action for American Jews, for fear of antagonizing both the American and German
governments.
At this point, one of the hot button topics that resulted from the Night of Broken
Glass was the issue of Jewish refugees and what country would take them. Despite
the clear need for a refuge for German Jews, the Zionist movement was not swayed
from their beliefs. Days after the events, the Hadassah, the Women’s Zionist
Organization of America, put out a newsletter that said that the goal of Palestine was
ever more important to Jewish survival—no mention was made of helping the Jews or
efforts to combat the Nazis. Rather, the group, through its newsletter, asked its
followers to raise money for the construction of the Hadassah University Hospital.
22
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The group argued that their fear of anti-Semitism was why they did not raise funds
for refugees—the sole interest was Palestine and establishing a homeland there. Leon
Wells later offered a biting critique of Nahum Goldmann, in particular, his urging in
1938 that American Jews stay calm, yet saying otherwise in his biography, claiming,
“From the first I was one of those, unfortunately a minority, who took the
phenomenon of Hitler seriously.”23 Goldmann, like many Zionist leaders, saw an
opportunity in the tragedy, and, “stated again and again that noting (in regards to the
European tragedy) could be done, and so he repeatedly used the tragedy to motivate
Jews for the postwar drive to establish a Jewish state.”24
In their first meeting following the Jewish pogroms, the American Jewish
Committee reiterated their forgiving position that they maintained throughout Hitler’s
time as leader of Germany. In an emergency council meeting that took place weeks
after the events, it was agreed, “that public Jewish demonstrations were inadvisable,
and so informed the key members of the four constituent organizations. In addition,
the General Council has kept in touch with situation through contacts in
Washington”.25 The group also pledged their support to the Palestine Initiative, a
Zionist program, pledging $2,500 to Zionist Programs. Following the economic
massacre of German Jewry, the group felt that their best approach was to remain in
the periphery, and place their faith in the government’s discretion.
A few months later, in January of 1939, the American Jewish Committee put out
its annual report, detailing what the group had done in the past year, and what it
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intended to do in the coming year. Naturally, the main topic at hand was the
persecution of Jews and Germany and the actions that could be taken to send relief
and help. The overall tone of the report was positive—the committee was particularly
happy with the efforts of the American press and called Roosevelt’s statement, “the
most stinging rebuke ever administered by a head of the Government to any great
power”. However, the Committee did not pledge a move towards more activism on
their part. Rather, they reaffirmed their faith as, “American citizens in the American
way of life”.26 In a critical time for the livelihood of their people, the group continued
to identify itself as Americans first. Consistent in its approach, the group believed that
making their complaints known with leading people of public influence was the best
action they could take. The group attempted to correct the misconception that an
influx of Jewish immigrants would displace American workers—the Committee
believed that this idea that Americans would lose their job was overblown, and an
influx of refugees would represent a boon to the American economy. Many
immigrants traveled as a family, which would create new markets, and as a result new
jobs. Towards the end of their statement, the group believes that unity across
ideological lines was necessary for success and a victory against Nazism. At this
point, especially following Kristallnacht, it had reached a point where action, and not
words, was the response that should have occurred. Instead, the Committee continued
with its inactive approach, putting its faith in the Federal Government that relief
would come.
With a greater sense of urgency emanating from Americans following the
stunning news of the Jewish pogroms, a few months later in February, Senator Robert
26

“American Jewish Committee 32nd Annual Report”, 37, AJCA, New York, NY.

48
Wagner and Representative Edith Rogers, introduced the Wagner-Rogers Bill, which
intended to admit 20,000 refugee children over a two-year period. In a rare show of
unity, the Jewish organizations backed the measure. The Bill gained support from
numerous people including that of former president Herbert Hoover. Describing his
support, the New York Times wrote, “Former President Herbert Hoover heartily
endorsed today the Wagner-Rogers resolution to permit entry into the United States,
outside the quota, of 20,000 German refugee children.”27
Despite the intentions of the measure, there was backlash from right wing groups
and restrictionists in Congress. It was the belief of the restrictionists that immigrants
entering the country were taking jobs from hard working Americans—to that point,
there was already eight to ten million Americans out of work. To open the doors to
refugees would only further compound the matter in their view. In many cases, this
restrictionist fervor manifested itself in anti-Semitic viewpoints, particularly in
regards to immigrants entering the country. Eventually, the bill was altered to include
the children in the current quota system the country used at the time. Disagreeing
with this change and without backing from Roosevelt or his administration, Senator
Wagner withdrew the bill.
Kristallnacht served as a turning point, and in many ways, brought to light issues
that many Americans, both Jews and non-Jews, were hesitant to address. The refugee
situation became ever more pressing and perplexing; despite the clear need to relocate
European Jews, many countries including the United States would not open their
doors to new immigrants, while the leading Zionist groups would not endorse a
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relocation to any country unless it was Palestine. There were multiple proposals that
came to the Zionist Organization of America in the months that followed that offered
the refugees a chance for survival, including proposed plans to send the Jews to
Africa or England—because it was not Palestine, the group refused to help fund the
projects. Wells described one such example of this singular focus, citing an example
from February 1939, writing “Hadassah leaders kept telling their membership that
Palestine was the only place for refugees, and they said that according to experts, it
was able to absorb 100,000 Jews a year. Hadassah did not give any details as to how
this could be accomplished”.28 The sole attention placed on Palestine came at the cost
of the livelihoods of numerous children, who were not receiving the support or aid
necessary to immigrate to a safer place. The events of November 9th and 10th was a
wake up call for Americans as well—to that point, many of the reports emanating
from Germany were either downplayed, or just hard to believe.
In the year that followed, Hitler and his Nazi regime became more aggressive—in
March 1939, the German army invaded Czechoslovakia and a few months later, Great
Britain and France, declared war on Germany. The invasion of Czechoslovakia had
long been planned, and occurred shortly following Kristallnacht. Similar to the
pogroms in Germany, the Jews were expelled from the country, either sent to
concentration camps or seeking refuge in other European countries. Describing how
the Jews were treated, a transcript from the Joint Distribution Committee conveyed
the maltreatment of the Jews, in writing, “The Soldiers seized Jewish
citizens…placed them in trucks, which were requisitioned for this purpose, and took
them at night across the new border, where they were dumped in open fields or
28
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forests”.29 Emboldened by a strong army, Hitler declared war on the rest of Europe.
In 1940, engaged in war with Great Britain and France, the Nazis invaded Belgium
and other smaller countries. In June, Hitler called for Operation Barbarossa, the
German invasion of the Soviet Union and the largest invasion of a country in the
history of warfare. Recently conquered territories and western parts of the Soviet
Union were where most of Europe’s Jewish population lived. Overall, the Nazis sent
over four million soldiers into the country.30
Despite ideological differences, many Jewish leaders realized that unity was vital
if proper relief efforts were going to be made. In a speech given by Louis Lipsky, a
prominent Zionist and member of the American Jewish Congress, he put aside his
beliefs and spoke of the need for American Jewish unity. In the speech, Lipsky said:
Through the democratic elections and the referendum, it is the intention of the
American Jewish Congress to organize American Jewry for the defense of Jewish
rights. This defense is an inevitable, natural American action. It is not intended
through the referendum to obtain any power or authority for the American Jewish
Congress. It is intended to get an expression of opinion from American Jews as to
whether they prefer anarchy to order in Jewish affairs…In view of the multiplicity
of Jewish organizations, their diverse programs, and the competitive nature of
some of them, our inability to bring about a union of national organizations, each
of which is interested in a separate, distinct program…It is the union of American
Jews which we aim to create through the democratic elections and the
referendum. It is a union aimed at no existing organization. Out of these efforts a
merger will evolve, in which all constructive elements may unite for the
furtherance of Jewish interests.31
Lipsky’s comments serve as an acknowledgement of the rift that existed between the
American Jewish organizations. Competition in the way of funding and resources
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helped to further divide the groups. Lipsky, an active Zionist himself, was cognizant
of the fact that unless the American Jewish groups could unite behind a common
cause, and put aside their ideological differences, a mounted, sustained relief effort
was impossible.
By 1942, the complexion of entire war had changed. After the attack on Pearl
Harbor by Japan, the United States entered the war, a major victory for the Allied
powers. Germany increased its power base across Europe, occupying numerous
countries. German persecution of Jews had also increased its scope, as the focus
shifted from the destruction of German Jews, to the complete and utter destruction of
Jewish identity in Europe. In fact, plans were in place for the systematic
extermination of Jewish life in Europe. Orchestrated by Heinrich Himmler, the plan
came to known as the “Final Solution” would feature the use of inhumane and brute
force, highlighting the disgusting power and processes of the concentration camp.
News of the “Final Solution” reached the United States reached the country in August
1942. To this point, the country had increased its efforts to combat the Nazis, but with
more of an American focus than one to save Jews. How did the American
Government react to news of this mass extermination? How did American Jewish
leaders and organizations respond? What measures were undertaken to combat the
Nazis? To this point, did American Jewish organizations find a way to put aside their
ideological differences to unite behind a common cause? Despite a clear need for aid
and relief, some Jewish leaders were still hesitant to openly speak out against Nazi
Germany, while others were reluctant to press Roosevelt for specific action.
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Chapter 4- The Final Solution and the American Jewish Inactivity
The immediate aftermath of Kristallnacht served as a wake up call for many
Americans, as well as a harbinger of things to come, that things were only going to
worsen. While there were certainly efforts made for by some Jewish groups to
respond, for many there seemed to be a sort of paralysis in deciding how to respond,
and what the situation called for. Harold Ickes, the United States Secretary of the
Interior and a prominent voice in the United States, was particularly shocked at the
overall lack of resolve that emanated from the Jewish groups. In his diary, describing
an encounter with Justice Louis Brandeis in 1939, a Supreme Court Justice and one of
the pre-eminent Jewish voices in the United States at the time, Ickes expressed shock
at the overall temerity of American Jewry to that point, particularly the upper class,
writing, “I spoke to him of the cowardice on the part of the rich Jews of America…I
would like to get a large group of them and tell them that they couldn’t hope to save
their money by meekly accepting whatever humiliations others chose to impose on
them”.1
To Ickes, it was hard to fathom that the upper class Jews in the United States were
not more active; they had the resources and connections to truly make an impact in
relief efforts, whether through donations or organizing rallies. In many ways, Ickes
saw this cowardice combining with a paralysis that shaped the relative inaction of
American Jewry. Other issues that plagued American Jews was the overall lack of
urgency, or as David Wyman puts it the “business as usual pattern” they maintained,
where “Too few schedules were rearranged. Vacations were rarely sacrificed…Even

1

Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 510.

Gross 53
from afar, this inability to adapt was painfully clear”.2 For whatever reason, whether
disbelief or indifference, fear or paralysis, many American Jews could not or would
not speak out or take action against the German government, regardless of the
overwhelming evidence that was reaching the United States. Despite the need for a
unified front more than ever, the different Jewish organizations could not come to
terms on a unified action, as disagreements persisted over what the main focus of the
American Jews should have been. A few short years later, the discord amongst
American Jewish groups and their leaders would come back to haunt them.
By 1941, anti-Jewish violence in Europe became more commonplace and violent
in nature. The Nazis began to establish ghettos for deported Jews across Poland, and
entire communities were being massacred in the German invasion of the Soviet
Union, including women and children. Part of this shift in attitude culminated in the
first of five killing centers being constructed in Chelmno, using gas vans as the
murder vehicles.3To this point, there were widespread rumors of Hitler’s stated
intention of a mass extermination of the Jewish identity in Europe; the exact dates
from whence this plan was originated remain somewhat uncertain but can be placed
in the final months of 1941 and early months of 1942. As early as July 1941, Herman
Goring had made mention of a solution to the “Jewish Question”, that would begin
with Operation Reinhard, which was the plan to systematically murder the Jews in
Poland.4 To garner support and justification, Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of
Propaganda, came out with a series of statements, critical of the Jews, describing the
2
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Jews as the enemy of the German people and calling for their destruction. In response
to Goebbels’ statements, Rabbi Wise passionately said, “Hitler and his crew are not
going to destroy us. We happen to belong to a living and imperishable people. What
4,000 years have not done, 10 years of Hitlerism will not do”.5 Wise was correct in
asserting that the Nazis would not destroy the Jews, but he could not have foreseen
how close Hitler would come.
On January 20, 1942, the Wannsee Conference, a meeting held between the SS
and German government agencies, took place. The topic at hand was the discussion
and implementation of the “final solution to the Jewish question,” a plan that
originated from Hitler’s right hand man, Heinrich Himmler.6 The plan called for the
deportation of Jews to one of the five killing centers, immediate death for those
unable to work, whether young, old or weak, gender segregation of the Jews, and
decimation of the remaining population through hard manual labor with little to
sustain them. The resulting deaths totaled over six million Jews by the end of World
War II.
Jewish groups around the world were receiving reports of increased Nazi intensity
in killing of the Jews, and were aware of Hitler’s rumored Final Solution. While there
remained skeptics to the veracity of the reports, American Jews were aware that
European Jewry was in dire straits. Zionists, in particular, saw it as an opportunity to
advocate for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and argued that homeland could help
solve the refugee problem. In the later months of 1941, Chaim Weizmann, the
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president of the World Jewish Congress, had travelled to the United States to, “sway
the government to support Zionist demands, as well as attain unity among Jewish
leaders for a coordinated fundraising drive to meet their immediate postwar
requirements”.7 The Zionist collective believed that the critical situation of the
European Jews presented an opening to where they could mobilize and convey their
Palestine initiative to a wider audience, particularly to the other Jewish groups that
had been hesitant to align themselves with the extreme Zionist perspective.
With the influx of reports of German brutality, it would seem as if a sense of
urgency would emanate from the American Jewish groups, but that did not happen.
Rather than unite for a common cause, the different groups were still sniping at each
other and finding avenues of unnecessary conflict. In a letter addressed to Rabbi
Wise, Nahum Goldmann, a fervent supporter of Zionism and heavily involved in the
World Jewish Congress, makes mention of these conflicts, regarding attacks being
made on the Congress, writing:
I enclose a copy of a circular letter which the headquarters of the UJA has sent to
its field men, and which makes one of the dirtiest on filthiest attacks on the WJC I
have ever read. The thing is still more incredible because of the fact that the WJC
has never appealed for funds in the United States, and is therefore not competing
in anyway with the UJA. It is obvious that the JDC people in the UJA have done
it…I think the moment has come when we have to take some firm action in
putting an end to the vicious and cowardly attacks on the JDC against us. They
never dare to come out into the open, but do their dirty work by methods such as
were employed for the UJA.8
In most cases, the way American Jewish groups raised money was through
fundraisers and donations; to openly compete for fundraising, especially when the
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groups should have been focused on what was happening in Europe, illustrated the
level of discontent that existed between the groups.
Goldmann’s anger illustrates the ideological and philosophical differences that
existed among many Jewish groups. The Joint Distribution Committee was amongst
the most active groups in terms of providing relief to European Jews; their numerous
outposts throughout Europe allowed them to assist in transporting and deporting
refugees to safer places. The United Jewish Appeal (UJA) was also among the more
active Jewish groups and worked closely with the Joint Distribution Committee on
their relief efforts in Europe. To these two groups, the focus had to be on immediate
relief for European Jews, not a “homeland” that was still years in the making. These
actions were in contrast to those taken by the Zionist Collective, who would not
divert privately raised funds or efforts away from Palestine; they would agree to help
move the refugees, but only if it was to Palestine. In light of these conflicts, the
Zionist movement saw an opportunity to make major strides in their Palestine
initiative.
On May 9th through the 11th in 1942, months after the Wannsee Conference, the
American Zionist movement met in the Biltmore hotel to discuss the challenges their
brethren were facing. American Jewish groups had been receiving numerous reports
of widespread Jewish slaughter. Despite the numerous reports, general disbelief or
skepticism at what was being reported was still rampant amongst the Jewish groups,
not only in the United States but also all over the world; the organizations,
“fundamentally could not perceive that Hitler actually meant to murder each and
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every Jew on European soil.”9 The dictator’s intentions were without precedent; antiSemitic persecution had existed for centuries, but never had it been so systematic or
focused in brutality. What further fed this doubt was that many of the reports the
groups were receiving were conflicting or contradictory; they, “had spoken of mass
murder, never a total plan”.10 The events at the Biltmore Conference should also be
mentioned because of what was happening with the Zionist leadership—up to that
point, Rabbi Wise had been the prominent voice and face of American Jewry and the
Zionist movement, but his ideological shift to moderate Zionism made him unpopular
amongst many Zionists. At the Conference, a young rabbi, Abba Hillel Silver gave a
rousing speech as he proudly and strongly called for a homeland in Palestine. Silver’s
aggressiveness and Wise’s moderate approach, coupled with Wise’s deteriorating
health, helped plant the seeds for change in Zionist leadership.11
In June, reports came from London that estimated the number of Jewish deaths at
the hands of the Nazis were between 700,000 and 1,000,000. A combination of
emotions ranging from rage to suspicion permeated throughout Jewish groups and
leaders. What was clear was that something had to be done to protest the Nazi
atrocities. On July 21st, the American Jewish Congress, Jewish Labor Committee, and
B’nai B’rith joined forces to cosponsor a protest rally in Madison Square Garden,
where American Jews were able to express their frustrations and anger towards the
German government; the rally also featured messages from Roosevelt and Churchill
that promised to hold the Nazis accountable for their actions. Describing the protest,
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the New York Times wrote, “The American people will hold the Nazis to ‘strict
accountability’ for their crimes of oppression on an inevitable day of reckoning”.12
Also featured at the rally was a speech from Rabbi Wise, who, typical to his approach
thus far, expressed support in Roosevelt, and maintained his belief in the collective
strength of the Jewish people that had lasted thousands of years. In expressing these
beliefs, Wise said:
Tonight, we meet, not only to sorrow over an ancient grief but also over a
limitless wrong of our own day, the Nazi threat to destroy Jewish people…we do
not mourn the destruction of the Jewish people. The destruction of the Jewish
people can never be. Its Temple may be destroyed, its people plundered and
stricken and wounded, but the eternal people shall not be destroyed.13
To understand Wise’s point is to have a basic understanding of the Jewish narrative.
As he later compares Hitler to Pharaoh and Haman, Wise was hearkening back to the
belief that Jews have been persecuted throughout their existence, and have maintained
an unbreakable spirit throughout
One group conspicuously absent from the protest rally was the American Jewish
Committee. The group refused participation, because, “it considered additional
appeals to be made there for the Yishuv’s (Jewish Palestinian Community) defense, a
controversial issue that also defied announced British policy”.14 Palestine, at that
time, was under British Control, and while the Zionists hoped it would be their
homeland, the American Jewish Committee would not take any action that went
against the decisions of the British government. Rather than being perceived as
against a government’s policy, the group chose to put out a statement that promised
12
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protect against oppression and tyranny. Consistent with their approach to this point,
the Committee was wary over provoking any anti-Semitic backlash, and rather, chose
to maintain its policy of quiet diplomacy. In the months that followed, the approach
of quiet diplomacy continued to produce minimal results.
That July, things abroad began to worsen. The Jewish organizations in the United
States faced increased pressure for action, as the information streaming in was
seemingly catastrophic, as gruesome and unthinkable acts were happening. The
situation of the Jews in Poland was reaching dire levels, as evidenced by various
reports from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. One such transcript detailed the degree
of degradation taken by the Nazi officers, including a testimony from a Soviet officer,
that said, “The Germans snatched the infants from their mothers’ arms and used them
for balls, bouncing and kicking them around the arena”.15 To many the level of
depravity being reported seemed too surreal to be possible. One month later, in
November, the Agency put out a report that included the number of deaths totaled in
Poland, and the methods the Nazis were using. In the report, dated November 24th
from London, at least “1,000,000 million Jews have already been annihilated by the
Nazis in Poland. During the mass expulsion…the victims were herded into cattle
cars…when the trains arrived at their destinations, half of the passengers were dead
from suffocation.”16 If they were not murdered the Jews were being sent to
concentration camps, where in most cases, death awaited them.
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A report from Gerhart Riegner on August 8th, the Swiss representative of the
World Jewish Congress, brought verified news of Hitler’s Final solution, including
the use of Zyklon B gas as the murder tool. What is now known as the “Riegner
telegram”, explicitly said, “Received an alarming report that in Fuhrer’s headquarters
plan discussed and under consideration all Jews in countries occupied or controlled
Germany number 3.5 to 4 million should after deportation and concentration in East
at one blow exterminated to resolve once and for all Jewish question in Europe.”17
Riegner’s report reached the United States on August 8th, but many leading Jews,
particularly Rabbi Wise, were left in the dark for nearly a month. When Wise finally
was told of the news, Sumner Welles, then the Undersecretary of State, alerted him
that he must remain silent until the information could be confirmed. As he waited for
word for what actions should be taken, Wise made inquiries to his contacts in Europe
for direction and more details. One such telegram advised Wise, as had Welles, that
“no publicity until report fully investigated, authenticity reasonably established. He
urges closest consideration this may be Nazi propaganda method to provoke
reaction”.18 After eleven weeks finally passed, until Wise was finally allowed to hold
a press conference, confirming to the press the fears of Jews everywhere that a plan
for a mass extermination was in place.
In discussing to the Riegner report, and how to respond, problems began to
manifest themselves amongst the federal government, particularly with a leading
Jewish government official. In a letter from the President, addressed to Henry
Morgenthau Jr., the United States Secretary of Treasury and one of the prominent
17
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Jews appointed by Roosevelt, it is mentioned that difference of opinion amongst the
different governmental departments was “unavoidable...too often, in recent months,
responsible officials of the government have made public criticism of other agencies
of the government…This is inadvisable at any time. But in times of war it is
particularly contrary to public policy.”19 Morgenthau was among the most active
Jewish representatives in the Federal government, and one of Roosevelt’s most
trusted friends and advisers. As the war progressed, so did Morgenthau’s level of
activity. Morgenthau, in particular, was critical of Cordell Hull, the Secretary of
State, throughout the war. Following the release of the Riegner report, Morgenthau
was especially bothered by the slow rate at which the State Department responded
and believed that the job they were doing was less than satisfactory, given the
situation at hand.20
In the months after, American Jewry remained divided, however. Despite a lack
of any meaningful action on the part of the Jewish refugees by Roosevelt, Wise
remained loyal, writing to Nahum Goldmann about a prospective press conference:
The thing that I am most fearful of is that any strong complaint against FDR, at
this time, will simply mean that we will hand him a gift of Congressional support
for the first time in this Congress, because Congress will certain approve of what
is not being done for the refugees. It is very easy to hold press conferences and to
call meetings, but we must in advance consider what it will lead to—that it will
shut every door and leave us utterly without hope of relief as far as FDR is
concerned. He is still our friend, even though he does not move as expeditiously
as we would wish. But he moves as fast as he can, in view of the Congress on his
hands, a bitterly hostile and in a very real sense partially anti-Semitic Congress.21
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However, Wise, at one point considered the heart and soul of American Jewry, was
beginning to be perceived as a Roosevelt figurehead, someone whose quiet diplomacy
and faith in the federal government had not been rewarded. Rising from the ashes of
Wise’s plight was Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, a Cleveland Rabbi whose passionate
Zionist speeches made him a prominent figure in the Zionist community. It was
notable that at one time, Silver looked upon Wise as a mentor. It was Wise who
helped convince Silver to get involved in American Zionist affairs, and prior to the
war, the two preached corresponding messages of the growth of the Jewish identity in
the United States, and the need to establish a Jewish State in Palestine.22
However, as the war progressed and Wise began to align himself to a more
moderate form of Zionism, a schism developed between the two rabbis over the main
focus of the Zionist collective. As Wise continued to preach patience and faith in
Roosevelt, Silver resented “Wise for gaining the ear of FDR only to have the
President contradict his promises behind closed doors in his talks with the British.”
Silver believed that a more aggressive approach was necessary, taking note of
Roosevelt’s penchant to please rather than take direct action; Silver believed that the
“the threat of suffering politically would keep FDR from going back on his word to
American Jewry.” As previously mentioned, Roosevelt excelled in the politics of
gesture; while many American Jews perceived his strong rebukes of Hitler as political
activity, little was actually done in the way of any concrete action.
With a more aggressive beliefs, and compared to the constraint exhibited by Wise,
Silver believed in a “more militant approach. Instead of ingratiating himself with the
administration, he envisioned the Democrats and Republicans outbidding each other
22
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for the Jewish vote”.23 Silver’s aggressiveness was a welcome change to the Zionist
contingent, and his belief in Palestine, coincided with the groups’ overriding goal.
Silver’s aggressiveness could also be the source of criticism however; Wyman
believed that Silver as a leader was, despite his propensity to create enemies, “a
forceful leader, but his single-minded commitment to postwar Jewish statehood
meant that he did not participate in the campaign for government rescue action”.24
Wyman’s description of Silver could be applied to numerous Zionists throughout the
war; namely, such singular focus on a specific and future goal such as Palestine,
detracted from the issues such as the pain and suffering endured by European Jews,
issues that were immediate and close in terms of feasibility.
The lack of unity that existed between the different American Jewish
organizations and the discord that manifested itself amongst many leading Jews was
ultimately the reason for the underwhelming response to the Nazi persecution and
extermination of European Jewry. Despite a mountain of evidence and numerous
warnings, it was as if a sort of paralysis overcame the Jewish consciousness in the
United States. As has been mentioned, numerous factors contributed to this relative
inaction. For one, anti-Semitic rhetoric and fervor was very much present in the
United States, which helped to foster this paralysis amongst American Jewry, as they
feared that any action could provoke anti-Semitic backlash. Another factor was a
general disbelief or skepticism from the American population that such horrible
things were actually occurring. People could not comprehend that humans could
reach the level of depravity that the Nazis were reaching; it just did not seem possible.
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But, the major contribution to this paralysis at this time was the battle waged between
extreme Zionists and the moderate Zionists and non-Zionists.
Prior to the war and throughout its duration, the goal of a Jewish homeland in
Palestine was a real, yet distinct, possibility. For extreme Zionists, an independent
Jewish state was their sole focus and priority; while the disturbing reports were
coming in, it was the belief of the extreme Zionists that private funds and resources
could not be diverted away from Palestine, despite the obvious need for immediate
help and action. In contrast, it was the belief of moderate Zionists that the dire
situation in Europe necessitated immediate action such as placement for the different
refugees, even though the location may not have been in Palestine. This fundamental
divide was at the core of the inaction on the part of American Jewry. Groups such as
the American Jewish Committee and B’nai B’rith attempted to mount their own
efforts to place pressure on the government for rescue action, but accomplished little.
The Zionist groups had the resources to plan protests and rallies but would not shift
their focus from a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
Ultimately, however, the discord and subsequent failure to respond could be
circled back to the Zionist divide. Even with full knowledge of the Final Solution,
Jewish leaders were still at odds over where the Jewish efforts and attention was
required. In a meeting for the American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs, on
September 1st, 1943, Rabbi Silver “emphasized that there can be no compromise on
the Zionist demand for a Jewish commonwealth”. The major issue at hand was
Palestine, and the Committee on Palestine drafted a declaration that attempted to
establish Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth. However, numerous groups took
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exception to the declaration; the major groups that took umbrage with the American
Jewish Committee and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations while the
Jewish Labor Committee remained, “divided in their attitude on this question”.25
American Jewry could not come to terms on what the next step should be for their
people; with countless lives lost, they were still ideologically divided on how to
respond to this tragedy. This divide was at the root of everything. Because the groups
could not agree, and the leaders remained divided, there was not a common cause or
singular leader, through whom pressure could be placed on Roosevelt for more action
to help European Jews. Without that pressure, and without a united front, Roosevelt
did not see that the collective American Jewry believed there was a proper way in
which to respond.
Before continuing, the question exists as to what any relief efforts in 1943 might
have accomplished. By this point, countless lives had been lost, and while efforts still
would have saved lives, it paled in comparison to the amount that could have been
saved. For the Zionist collective, news of the Final Solution further reinforced their
belief in the establishment of an independent Jewish state. Groups like the American
Jewish Committee and B’nai B’rith were in many ways, helpless at this point, as they
lacked the resources and political clout to sustain any mounted relief efforts. It is
unfortunate, but fair to question, at this point, what any relief efforts might have
accomplished.
As the war progressed, it only got worse before it got better for European Jewry.
Following news of the Final Solution, the Nazi army increased its violence in Europe,
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particularly in Poland, and then Vichy, France.26 It was not until early in 1943, that
the Allied involvement, particularly that of the United States, began to increase in
intensity, as the United States and British military began to bomb Nazi Germany on a
consistent basis. In the United States, the federal government began to take a
somewhat more aggressive approach, as the War Refugee Board was formed,
designed to aid those persecuted and imprisoned by the Nazis.
Another seminal moment came later, in November 1944, when the War Refugee
Board published to the American press, the Vrba-Wetzler Report, also known as the
Auschwitz Protocol, a detailed account of mass murder at the concentration camp in
Auschwitz, Poland. The report authored by Rudolf Vrba and Alfred Wetzler, two
Slovakian Jews who managed to escape from Auschwitz, attempted to provide
context to the amount of killings taking place at the concentration camps as well as
awaken the American consciousness to the degree of brutality and depravity of the
Nazis. Describing the brutal manner in which the Jews were murdered, the report
described the gas chambers, writing that, “it is presumed that this is a ‘CYANIDE’
mixture of some sort which turns into gas at a certain temperature. After three
minutes, everyone in the chamber is dead…the chamber is then opened and the
‘special squad’ carts the bodies on flat trucks to the furnace rooms where burning
takes place”.27 Even after the report came to the United States, there was still a sense
of disbelief emanating from many in the United States.
In the years that followed, the Nazi movement lost steam. The United States
entrance into the war in 1942 changed the complexion of it. By 1945, an Allied
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victory was all but assured, as the Nazi concentration camps were being liberated.
Realizing his apparent defeat, Adolf Hitler committed suicide on April 30, 1945,
followed in the next month by his henchmen, Joseph Goebbels and Heinrich
Himmler. Following the end of the war, the Allied forces, the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, and the United States held the Nuremberg Trials, prosecuting the
prominent members and actors of Nazi Germany. While nothing could make up for
the millions of lives lost or heal the wounds created by the Holocaust, the Nuremberg
trials put to death numerous perpetrators of the gross and despicable actions that took
place.
For the Zionist collective, vindication would come on May 14, 1948, as David
Ben Gurion, the head of the World Zionist Organization declared the establishment of
a Jewish state in Israel. A process that had started decades earlier had finally come to
fruition. While this could certainly be viewed as a Zionist victory, it begs the question
of the cost at which it came. Israel long was a goal of the Zionist, and those fervent
supporters throughout the war and the persecution of European Jewry believed that
funds and resources could not be diverted from establishing a Jewish state. Moderate
Zionists and non-Zionists believed that the situation at hand merited their attention;
establishing a homeland was naturally important, but it was not an immediate goal at
the time. What started out as a sort of paralysis rooted in fear of anti-Semitic backlash
both domestically and abroad eventually developed into an ideological divide over
the most pressing priority for world Jewry. It was this fundamental divide that lay at
the root of American Jewish discontent, and ultimately, helped to shape their
underwhelming response to the Holocaust.
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Chapter 5- A Collective Failure
History is littered with countless examples of prejudice, anti-Semitism, and
racism towards different ethnic groups. The United States, in particular, has a
checkered history in this regard, with their treatment of Native Americans and
African Americans a stain many try to forget. Even today, there are still stubborn
remnants of anti-Semitism and racism in the country. This history of religious and
ethnic persecution, while no doubt negative, provided a valuable learning experience
in the context of human interaction. The African American history in the United
States provides a good contrast in particular to the Jewish history and organized,
united movements. For much of their time in the United States, African Americans
were considered slaves, treated as less than humans. Similar to the Jewish
organizations, not every African American agreed on the best course of action to take
in response to the racial persecution they experienced. That being said, unlike
American Jewry during the Holocaust, when push came to shove, during the Civil
Rights movement, African Americans were able to unite behind one common cause,
equality in all aspects of life, putting any ideological or political differences behind
them for the betterment of their livelihoods.
The response is where American Jewry failed as a collective entity. As early as
1928, American Jewry was very aware of a growing threat in Germany. Despite this
knowledge, American Jewish organizations, from the moderate American Jewish
Committee to the extreme Zionist beliefs maintained in the American Jewish
Congress and World Jewish Congress, collectively failed throughout the war to unite
behind a common cause, saving and preventing European Jews from utter and total
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destruction. Without a concentrated message, American Jewish leaders could not
place any pressure on President Roosevelt, which allowed him to get by using a
combination of powerful statements and political gestures aimed at appeasing the
American Jewish identity. At the time, during the duration of the Nazi regime, the
Jewish population in the United States numbered between four and five million
people, out of a population that numbered 140 million and increasing by 1945.1
Representing no more than three to five percent of the American voting public during
this period, American Jewish political influence was limited with the President.
However, there is also the question of what-if: What if American Jewry had
united behind a common cause and placed pressure on Roosevelt to act in response to
the actions in Nazi Germany? Would they have accomplished all that much? The
answer, in all likelihood, is an unfortunate, but resounding, no. As mentioned earlier,
American Jews represented only a small part of the eligible voters, so they lacked the
political clout to influence the President. When Hitler was appointed chancellor, there
were far more pressing issues as well that demanded Roosevelt’s immediate
attention—the country was still reeling from the crippling impact of the Great
Depression, and restoring the nation’s economy took precedence. The economic
climate in the United States also affected Roosevelt’s perspective in other areas,
particularly immigration; there was a fear to many Americans, that allowing
immigrants into the country, in this situation, Jewish refugees, would take jobs away
from American citizens. Despite numerous proposals, including the Wagner-Rogers
Bill, and due to his indebtedness to Breckenridge Long, Roosevelt never raised the
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quota system placed on immigrants throughout the war. Ultimately, throughout the
reign of Hitler in Nazi Germany, Roosevelt had to perform a balancing act, in many
cases, came at the cost of particular ethnic groups. Even with a united, sustained
movement from American Jewry, it is fair to question how much they would have
been able to accomplish.
Placing blame and culpability can often be a difficult, and often, futile exercise in
any endeavor. In this case, it is no different. While the stated goal of this entire thesis
was to put forth that the lack of unity between the various American Jewish groups
and their leaders and their failure to respond shaped the underwhelming response that
came from the United States, they are not the only culprits in this collective failure.
President Roosevelt, despite a copious amount of evidence and ample opportunity,
was slow to respond throughout the reign of Adolf Hitler. Many of the American
Jews in high positions appointed by Roosevelt stayed in line with the policy of the
President, rather than act out in support of their religious brethren. Anti-Semitic
fervor also was a key determinant in the reason many Jews would not speak or act out
against Nazi Germany. That being said, most of the culpability can be placed at the
hands of the American Jewish organizations. In what Rabbi Wise called the “critical
hour in the life of our people,” not enough was done.2
In the end, rather than uniting behind the idea of rescuing their European brethren,
the leading organizations and their leaders could not agree on whether private funds
should be used, whether what was taking place could be sacrificed with Palestine in
sight. The extreme Zionist groups would not divert any funds or attention away from
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establishing a Jewish homeland. Moderate Zionists and Non-Zionists did not have the
strength nor the organization to organize any movement or rally that would truly
produce substantive change. The lack of unity also enveloped itself in a crisis in
leadership, as leaders such as Rabbi Wise, Rabbi Silver, Chaim Weizmann, Nahum
Goldmann, Justice Brandeis, and Henry Morgenthau among many prominent Jews,
holding much respect but never able to organize a movement or pressure of any
effectiveness in any direction. What we are left with as a nation, and as co-religionists
today, is acknowledgement of the American Jewish failure to respond because of the
discordance and in fighting between the groups and their leaders, a failure that is
inexcusable and troubling on every level as deep investigation illustrates, and the
knowledge that as a whole, this lack of unity shaped the underwhelming response the
Nazis’ persecution of European Jews, in what is the most inhumane tragedy history
has ever seen.
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